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ABSTRACT
Many IoT devices, especially those deployed at the network edge have limited power
resources. A number of attacks aim to exhaust these resources and drain the bat-
teries of such edge nodes. In this work, we study the effects of a variety of battery
draining attacks against edge nodes. Through simulation, we clarify the extent to
which such attacks are able to increase the usage and hence waste the power re-
sources of edge nodes. Specifically, we implement hello flooding, packet flooding,
selective forwarding, rank attack, and versioning attack in ContikiOS and simulate
them in the Cooja simulator, and measure and report a number of time and power
resource usage metrics including CPU time, low power mode time, TX/RX time,
and battery consumption. Besides, we test the stretch attack with three different
batteries as an extreme scenario. Our extensive measurements enable us to com-
pare the effectiveness of these attacks. Our results show that Versioning attack is
the most severe attack in terms of draining the power resources of the network,
followed by Packet Flooding and Hello Flood attacks. Furthermore, we confirm that
Selective Forwarding and Rank attacks are not able to considerably increase the
power resource usage in our scenarios. By quantifying the effects of these attacks,
we demonstrate that under specific scenarios, Versioning attack can be three to four
times as effective as Packet Flooding and Hello Flood attacks in wasting network
resources, while Packet Flooding is generally comparable to Hello Flood in CPU
and TX time usage increase but twice as powerful in draining device batteries.
KEYWORDS
Edge computing, Internet of things, smart sensors, battery draining attacks,
Cooja, ContikiOS
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1. Introduction
Information technology has grown throughout the past century to become one of the
most prominent features in our lives. This can partially be credited to devices becoming
smaller, cheaper and yet more powerful. These changes have caused certain devices to
not just become prominent in business but also in peoples homes and their everyday
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life. With companies such as Amazon attempting to get smart speakers into the homes
of millions and other companies trying to do the same with taheir smart devices, there
seems to have been some neglect in making them as secure as possible. This may
seem more serious when considering the predictions that by 2020 more than 50 billion
devices will be deployed to serve the Internet of Things (IoT) [1].
In recent years IoT has been becoming increasingly popular, and with the promise
to make peoples’ lives easier more people are using resource-constrained IoT devices.
Such devices have the ability to quickly and accurately measure and analyze important
information such as levels of air pollution, healthcare indicators and can even be used
in military applications. However, with the number of users increasing so does the
potential for cyberattacks. Companies’ main goal is to release their devices as soon
as possible. That means that few devices have regular firmware upgrades [2] and they
are usually paired with weak components making them increasingly appetizing for
attackers. One of the main components that is particularly vulnerable is the small
battery these devices often contain. Even though IoT is becoming a necessary part of
everyday life, there are many serious vulnerabilities that come along with it, and until
they are resolved the question will remain: Do we want simplicity or security?
In this paper, network edge devices, and more specifically resource-constrained IoT
devices are examined. These devices will often contain batteries that should be easy
to drain, given that the right attack is carried out. With IoT becoming increasingly
popular, and with it becoming easier for home and businesses to adopt these devices
to their needs, the threat of these types of attacks is becoming more worrying. This
work studies the impacts of hello flooding, packet flooding, selective forwarding, rank
attack, stretch attack and versioning attack by implementing them in ContikiOS and
simulating them in Cooja simulator. These attacks focus on exhausting the batteries
of the devices.
The key contributions in the paper are provided as follows:
• Several simulation tools were studied and compared in terms of accuracy, and
their ability to measure power consumption and simulate edge of network devices.
• Six well-known battery draining attacks are implemented in ContikiOS and then
simulated in Cooja simulator.
• Effects on nodes’ batteries for each simulated attack are studied. Several metrics
were used to make conclusions on how the attacks exhaust batteries.
• A comparison among attacks is presented showing the comparative severity of
the attack based on several energy and time consumption metrics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our considered
Cisco’s 7-layer IoT architecture, the technologies used in IoT devices and discuss the
IoT security concerns. In Section 3, we briefly discuss the attacks that may occur in
IoT networks. In Section 4, we present the most significant works that study the effects
of battery draining attacks in IoT. In Section 5, we discuss the software components
used in our work. In Section 6, we describe the implemented attacks, assumptions, and
simulated scenarios. In Section 8, we present our experimental results obtained using
the Cooja simulator. In Section 9, we compare and evaluate the results from different
attacks. In Section 10, we conclude and discuss possible future research directions.
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Figure 1. 7-layer IoT architecture proposed by Cisco
2. Background
2.1. IoT architecture
Defining IoT is a heavily debated topic as well as defining what an IoT architecture
is. However, what has been agreed on is that for the concept of IoT to work it needs
to consist of a network, sensor and communications [3]. One of the most detailed
architectures to be used in this paper is the 7-layer model proposed by Cisco [4]. As
shown in Figure 1, it consists of the following layers:
Level 1 Physical Devices and Controllers - This layer contains the things in the IoT.
This includes a wide range of endpoint devices which can send or receive information
(e.g., sensors and radio-frequency identification (RFID) readers) [5].
Level 2 Connectivity - This level contains all components able to transmit informa-
tion. The transmissions can be between devices in the first level, between the compo-
nents in this level or between the first and third level.
Level 3 Edge (fog) Computing - This is the first level where data processing occurs.
Large amounts of information may be collected here. However, this level allows the
system to only pass on relevant packets. This is essential as it reduces the load on
higher levels. It also allows data to be formatted, expanded or decoded before it is
needed by processing.
Level 4 Data Accumulation - Until this point the data is in motion. Typically, the re-
quired information processing cannot be done at network speeds. As a result, this level
converts the data in motion to data at rest. This means the data gets stored so that
applications can access it when necessary. Data can also be transformed, recombined
and recomputed ready for usage in the higher levels.
Level 5 Data Abstraction - This level allows data to be stored in a more efficient way
to improve performance of the higher levels. Some of the operations are normalisation,
indexing, formatting, validation, consolidation of data and providing access to multiple
data stores [5].
Level 6 Application - The information is interpreted at this level and the applica-
tions interact with the data accumulation and data abstraction layers. The possible
applications at this level can be very varied across different markets. For example,
control applications and business intelligence applications are likely to use the data in
very different ways.
Level 7 Collaboration and Processes - The highest level pulls everything together
and the system is useless unless the information provided at this step is useful. People
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should cooperate and use the data from the IoT system to make informed decisions.
2.2. Technologies in IoT devices
IoT started out with RFID and was seen as a way to get information about a product
which was fitted with RFID chip. This attempt to get everyday objects into cyber space
has carried on from there with various technologies which this section will explore.
One of the most used technologies in computers is Wi-Fi. With many companies
having almost total Wi-Fi coverage it seems an almost obvious solution for IoT as well.
However, it may not always be the most appropriate choice. This is because, as men-
tioned earlier, IoT devices tend to have small batteries and some Wi-Fi technologies,
in particular 802.11a/b/g/n/ac for IoT, have a high energy usage [6]. Although the
benefits are clear, such as low cost and easy deployment, devices with smaller batteries
may not see this technology as a feasible choice. There are, however, alternatives to
this technology.
Wi-Fi HaLow (802.11ah) [7] was designed to reduce power consumption by using
wake/sleep periods and is a better choice for IoT. Furthermore, it has 1-kilometre
range. However, this technology has never really taken off due to the fact that it
requires a specialised access point and hardware.
There is a new technology arriving called High-Efficiency Wireless (HEW)
(802.11ax) [8] which is being designed for IoT. This has the benefits of having a
low power consumption and although it may not have the range of other technologies,
for many devices it will be seen as very useful, especially for wearable technology.
Bluetooth is seen as an inexpensive and low radius technology that can benefit some
types of IoT networks. This technology has a small radius and is useful for devices
such as printers and some PCs. Older versions of Bluetooth have been somewhat
inadequate for the usage of IoT, due to the low range and security concerns. However,
newer Bluetooth technology, in particular Bluetooth 5 has higher data rate and higher
radius than ever before at one kilometre, making Bluetooth a real contender for an
effective IoT technology [9]. It is also known that Bluetooth and Wi-Fi can co-exist, so
it may be worth noting that if some devices require Wi-Fi and some require Bluetooth
that they can still effectively work together. That means that using the right type of
technology in a device can keep the power usage as low as possible, not just for the
device but also for the network as a whole [10].
2.3. The RPL protocol
A new routing protocol for IoT devices is IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and
Lossy Networks (RPL). According to [11], RPL is a standardised lightweight protocol
that is mostly used in 6LoWPAN networks. By using an Objective Function (OF),
RPL creates a Destination-Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG) between the
nodes in a 6LoWPAN network. OFs enhance routing metrics such as the Expected
Transmission Count (ETX) in order to form routes in the DODAG. Both unidirectional
traffic towards the DODAG root and bidirectional traffic between nodes and the root
are supported by the protocol. A single 6LoWPAN network can have more than one
RPL instances, and a global DODAG can have a local RPL DODAG among several
nodes. The IPv6 address of the node is used as its ID. Nodes also store their DODAG
neighbours in a list and they can have one or more parents, except for the root. In
addition, all nodes have a rank where it’s lowest at the root.
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RPL comes with new ICMPv6 control messages. DODAG Information Object (DIO)
messages are initially sent by the root. These messages contain information about the
rank of the broadcasting node (which is the distance of the node from the backbone
network), the OF, and the DODAG ID. Apart from that, DIO messages help main-
taining the DODAG. If a node gets a DIO message, it determines its rank (according
to the advertised rank in the received message) and the cost of getting to the sending
node from itself. Each node sends these messages in intervals based on trickle timer
[12]. This timer also prevents sending unnecessary DIO messages.
In order for a node to join the network, it must get a DIO message or multicast
a DODAG Information Solicitation (DIS) message to request a DIO message. When
other devices get the DIS message, they will start broadcasting DIO messages, and the
new node can join the DODAG. Then, a Destination Advertisement Object (DAO)
message is sent by the new node to its parent. In some cases, parents may send
DIO messages to sub-DODAG in order to request DAO messages. DAO messages
are important for creating downward routes (from root to node). Nodes update their
routing table when a DAO message is received. If routing tables are empty or if packets
are destined for the root, the node will forward a packet up to its most preferred parent.
2.4. Security concerns of IoT devices
There are multiple concerns regarding security when it comes to IoT devices; because
their size puts constraints on what they can feasibly achieve to keep them secure. This
section will focus on the security issues of Level 1 of the IoT architecture presented
in Subsection 2.1. At this level, vulnerabilities of physical devices and controllers are
discussed. Although higher layers tend to have a high level of security, the devices
themselves that people interact with tend to have very little security, in an effort to
keep them small and low powered.
2.4.1. Processing power
Many IoT devices have the ability to provide on-device processing. This includes con-
verting data to another format, enhancing data so the most important components are
highlighted and making sure data hits a set of rules by validating it [13]. For example,
smart sensors usually need wireless connectivity and other components which require
processing power. This is difficult to achieve in a small device. Thus, some of these
devices will have a power consumption as little as 50 to 100 Million Instructions per
Second (MIPS) [14]. Due to cost restrictions, it is not practical to deploy significant
resources to help improve the security of these devices. An important work that looks
at creating a secure low powered IoT system is from Brooks et al. [15]. The authors
investigate the possibility of building a low cost and low-powered processor yet to still
ensuring its high security.
2.4.2. Battery life
One of the biggest concerns regarding IoT is the size of the battery, and how easily the
energy consumption of a device can be manipulated to quickly drain the battery. A
report from Silicon Labs [16] looks at how people expect to have more functionality for
their devices, without increasing their size or cost. This quite often leads the battery to
remain inadequate and vulnerable. There are very few options that can be physically
used in IoT devices due to size constraints. The main options are AAA, CR2032,
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Table 1. Different types of commonly used IoT batteries
Name 2x AAA CR2032 CR123A CR2
Voltage 3V 3V 3V 3V
Capacity 1000 mAh 225 mAh 1500 mAh 800 mAh
Material Alkaline LiMnO2 Lithium Lithium
CR123A, and CR2 batteries. Table 1 shows the differences between these batteries.
In an effort to solve the battery issues, Calhoun et al. [17] proposed using a battery-
free technology for IoT devices. Specifically, they suggest using ambient radio signals
to power devices. However, this has not been seen as feasible, with more money being
spent in improving current batteries, rather than going battery-free.
2.4.3. Bandwidth
The amount of data produced by IoT devices at Level 1 is so large that it is almost
impossible for it to transmit directly to the cloud servers through the gateway without
any compression. This is because when the device attempts to transmit such a large
amount of uncompressed data it will cause packets to be dropped and lost. This means
that it is necessary for the data sent to be pre-processed, kept of a high quality and
made so that it does not use up too many resources [18]. For IoT nodes, the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocol is typically used to create a secure connection between
the different layers when transporting data. Yet, this does not keep these devices or
their data secure. This is because the device itself has not been authenticated and
these encryption methods do nothing to prevent an attacker taking over the node [19].
3. Battery draining attacks in IoT
When designing an IoT device, one of the main overlooked issues is the size of the
battery that is being used. This is often due to various reasons such as keeping the
device small and portable. Due to this small size, devices are vulnerable. These issues
become more serious when, for example, looking at types of devices that patients
may wear to detect changes in their body. Below we explore specific attacks that are
designed to drain the batteries of IoT devices.
3.1. Denial of sleep
Various attacks can cause smart devices to consume more energy. Krentz et al. in [20]
explore three denial of sleep attacks. The first type of attack is called ‘Ding Dong
Ditching’. This type of attack uses a combination of four denial of sleep attacks to try
to attack a device. This increases the potential for at least one of the attacks to work
and to get a positive result. The first type of attack is a jamming attack. A jamming
attack causes the network to become unusable by people and can be accomplished by
emitting RF signal [21]. This type of attack is called a constant jammer where the
MAC layer is bypassed by constantly transmitting random bits of data through an
RF signal. By constantly transmitting data the transfer does not wait for a channel
to become idle and therefore does not follow the MAC layer rules [22].
The next part of this attack is broadcasting, where an adversary will send a ping
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to every host, which in turn will send an ICMP response. Using this information, the
adversary can carry out further attacks that include the other nodes on the network
being your slaves.
The final aspect of this attack is a droplet attack. This occurs when the beginning
of an 802.15.4 frame is sent and then it stops transmitting. This leaves the receiver
of this frame in receive mode. By using all of these attacks or just a combination you
can create a good attack where elements of the attack are likely to get through and
help drain the batteries of the edge devices.
3.2. Flooding attack
The main type of flooding attack is a ‘Hello’ Flooding attack. This is where a mali-
cious RPL node creates massive amount of traffic by sending DIS messages to other
RPL nodes, causing the recipient nodes to respond by sending DIO messages. As a
result, congestion is created in the network and nodes are energy exhausted. The other
element to this attack is that if the attacker has a large enough broadcasting range
they can make nodes think that they are their neighbour and forward them packets.
They can also make the legitimate node try to send them packets thinking they are
next to them. However, packets will end up getting lost in the network causing it to
flooding and slow down more because node are actually far away [23].
3.3. Vampire attack
This type of attack will put a constant strain on device’s small batteries causing them
to stop working. Two types of vampire attacks are typically distinguished [24]. The
first is a stretch attack and the second is a carousel attack. A stretch attack sends a
packet along a longer route around the network by changing the information in the
header of the packet. This attack could be paired with certain other attacks to make
them more powerful and effective. Authors in [25] have shown that using a stretch
attack whilst not being paired can increase energy consumption by a factor of 4.
Moreover, this attack can be easily carried out, especially when the network does not
employ authentication, as the attacker can simply change the route of the packet in
the header.
Regarding carousel attack, it loops a packet around a network before it eventually
arrives at its location. Both of these attacks can be used in combination with other
types of attack. However, if used alone they may be left undetected making it difficult
to defend against.
There have been multiple attempts to prevent these attacks. However, the defence
mechanisms run into the issue of using more power than the attack itself. One solution
that has been looked at is a zero-power notification which will create an alert when
an attack is being detected [26].
4. Related work
Authors in [20] looked at ‘Ding-dong ditching’ and stated that in order to find out the
energy consumption of these attacks one needs to look at all the aspects separately.
Firstly, they tested jamming attacks. To do this, they sent out an emitted radio noise
in four subsequent runs and the attacked node had no defences set up to protect
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itself. This attack showed that after 4.286 milliseconds the node had a mean energy
consumption of 0.372 mJ. Once again, running a broadcast attack shows that it had a
mean energy consumption of 0.7 mJ. Next, they tested unicast attack and this showed
a mean usage of 0.7 mJ again. Authors also looked at some ways to defend against
these attacks. They suggested that by using an idea called dozing and another called
POTR, one can significantly reduce the amount of power consumption from these
attacks.
In another work, Vasserman et al. [24] studied the effects of stretch and carousel
attacks. Firstly, a legitimate packet was sent from source to sink. Authors recorded
the average power consumption which was around 0.008 as a fraction of node energy
consumed. Then, they deployed a stretch attack and measured again the power con-
sumption throughout the network. They found an average power consumption of 0.01
as a fraction of node energy consumed. Finally, they deployed carousel attack which
had an average power consumption of 0.07 as a fraction of node energy consumed.
Authors showed that when using a carousel attack the power consumption can be
8.75 times higher than when a legitimate node is being sent around. The results of
power consumption were based on number of packets sent from one randomly placed
malicious node.
Another interesting work in the field of RPL attacks is from Mayzaud et al. [27].
Authors investigate how the RPL versioning system can be exploited to gain an ad-
vantage in the topology and also force children nodes to route packets via a malicious
node. They use several metrics such as overhead, delivery ratio, end-to-end delay, rank
inconsistencies and loops. However, they do not look at the energy utilised by nodes
during the attack.
In [28], authors are studying the RPL protocol and how it can be exploited. They
implement well-known routing attacks in ContikiOS using Cooja simulator. After sim-
ulating attacks, they propose an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) which implements
a lightweight heartbeat protocol. Although their work looks promising, they do not
present results of nodes’ energy consumption during several routing attacks.
All in all, it is clear that certain aspects of edge node attacks have not been suffi-
ciently covered. Existing works describe how attacks increase energy consumption of
devices, but few explore and quantify to what extent exactly established Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attacks will affect battery consumption, especially in comparison with
other types of attack and in ad hoc scenarios.
4.1. Research questions
The overall goal of our paper is to examine the negative effects of the most known
DoS attacks on IoT devices. The focus is on the battery and on finding out the most
severe attack that could occur in a smart device. The following research questions will
be discussed:
(1) How easy is to implement the various DoS attacks in ContikiOS? Which simu-
lator is the most accurate and allows measuring of device’s power consumption?
(2) What are the consequences on battery life for each of the implemented attack?
How do the attacks compare in terms of quantitative metrics of time and power
consumption?
(3) How effective is the Stretch Attack in different scenarios in which devices use
different battery types and sizes?
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5. Simulation tool
Several criteria were considered for choosing the simulation tool, first and foremost is
accuracy. The simulation tool has to be well established and have a common consensus
that the results it could produce are accurate. Secondly, it is the ability to measure
power consumption. Many network simulation tools do not have the ability to measure
power. However, a few have additional modules can be used to do this. Finally, it
should be able to simulate network edge topologies. Considering that the purpose of
this experiment was to look at smart devices, this criterion is also important. The
network has not only had the attack packets flowing through the network but also
legitimate data, as this could also affect the power consumption. Table 2 lists the
potential network simulation tools and provides a short description about whether or
not they are suitable regarding each of the three criteria.
Table 2. Potential tools for IoT simulations
Simulation tool Accuracy
Power
measurement
Edge of network
simulation
TOSSIM
Commonly used in
literature to accurately
simulate ‘TinyOS’.
Add on through
Power Tossim.
Yes. Designed to
run using ‘TinyOS’.
NS-2/3
Testing done to
compare it to real
world situations.
No.
Yes. Needs
manual configuration.
Cooja
Testing done to
compare it to real
world situations.
Add on through
energest and powertrace.
Designed to be used with
wireless sensor networks.
Although our initial simulations were done using NS-2 and then swapping to NS-3,
it was decided that these simulators may not be suitable due to not being accurate in
measuring power consumption [29]. Therefore, the network simulation tool was chosen
to be Cooja which runs on ContikiOS [30]. An advantage of using Cooja is that it
enables uploading of simulated firmware into real physical sensors.
6. Implementing DoS attacks in Cooja
Our first goal is to explore how various types of DoS attacks can be used to drain the
batteries of smart devices. For this reason, several attacks were implemented and are
presented in this section.
The first attack to be explored is the ‘Hello’ flooding attack. This is a Layer 2 attack
and, therefore, will affect device data transmission. As mentioned before, when a new
node joins a network, it sends DIS messages to all its neighbours. These neighbours
then respond with DIO messages. In this attack, a malicious node sends too many DIS
messages very frequently causing network congestion. The attack diagram is given in
Figure 2. It shows a malicious node forwarding DIS messages (Hello packets) to nodes
within the network.
A similar implemented attack is the packet flooding. This attack occurs when a
malicious node rapidly sends packets to other nodes in the network forcing them to
run their checking mechanisms [5]. As a result, the energy of the nodes is exhausted.
In our work, malicious node sends unicast packets to server in order to exhaust it.
Another attack that we consider is the selective forwarding. This kind of attack
occurs when a malicious node chooses which packets to forward to the next node. It
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Figure 2. Hello flooding
Figure 3. Blackhole attack
is called a greyhole attack if some packets pass through and some are dropped. If all
packets are dropped, it is called a blackhole attack [31]. Figure 3 shows the diagram of
a blackhole attack. Nodes C, D and E send packets to node A via a malicious node B.
Yet, B drops all packets and nothing is received at node A. This attack aims to disrupt
routing paths. Our implementation is a greyhole attack since the DIO messages are
allowed to pass from malicious node while the data packets are dropped. This can be
modified to drop different ratios of packets or look at the contents of packets and drop
important ones.
Figure 4. Rank attack
The fourth implemented attack is the versioning attack. The aim of the attack is
to again deplete the energy of the nodes. A malicious node increments the DODAG
version number which is now inconsistent with other nodes in the network. RPL detects
this error in version numbers and performs a global repair which unnecessarily rebuilds
10
the network [32].
The rank attack is the fifth implemented attack in ContikiOS. Attacker node ad-
vertises a low rank so that it attracts all nodes in the DODAG to connect to it so that
all packets pass through it [32]. As a consequence, a malicious node exploits the RPL
protocol to cause a sinkhole attack. This can be achieved if the rank of a malicious
node is always one more than the root node. On the left of Figure 4, the network di-
agram without the attack is presented. Here, all children are connected to the closest
parents. On the right hand side, the diagram shows the network when the attack is
initiated. All children choose malicious node C as their parent.
7. Environment setup and scenarios
7.1. Contiki configuration
In order to run experiments, we configured Cooja and ContikiOS as described in [30].
Moreover, Powertrace was setup and added to our project. This module is provided
by ContikiOS and is able to track all packets and their transmission and receive rates.
Also, the Zolertia Z1 mote was used as hardware platform which uses the MSP430
microcontroller and the CC2420 radio transceiver. Table 3 presents the current con-
sumption of each of Z1’s components. A voltage of 3V for all the components has been
used as it is the voltage supplied by two AA batteries and it is recommended by Z1
datasheet [33]. Each of these batteries have a capacity ranging from 450 mAh to 2640
mAh depending on drain rate [34].
Table 3. Z1 component datasheet values
Mode Voltage Current Consumption
Power down 3V 20 µ A
IDLE 3V 426 µ A
RX 3V 18.8 mA
TX 3V 17.4 mA
7.2. Assumptions and scenarios
The purpose of our experiments is to explore how various attacks can be used to
drain the batteries of network edge IoT devices. The experiments involve the attacks
described in Section 6. These attacks are known to slow down a network but not much
is known about the effects they have on battery-powered devices.
After deciding the simulator for our experiments, several other assumptions needed
to be made. Firstly, the server and malicious node in all scenarios have infinite power.
Secondly, the network for all the experiments should be the same so that each exper-
iment can be set up accurately each time. This should allow the results to be more
understandable.
We considered a network of size seven with one server, five honest nodes, and one
malicious node. We planned to study the effects of attacks when nodes are placed in
an ad hoc manner, hence we generated a topology with random placements of nodes in
Cooja. This topology is shown in Figure 5, in which the server is shown in green, honest
nodes in yellow, and the malicious node in purple. This configuration is simulated for
11
Figure 5. Simulated network
5 hours having only honest nodes and then the simulation was repeated after adding
the malicious node. The malicious node runs a different attack in each scenario so
that the effects of each attack are studied. All the attacks were simulated using the
same network topology. Therefore, the standard network size remained at seven, the
standard battery size remained at two AA batteries and the number of compromised
nodes remained at one.
8. Experimental results
This section presents the results from simulating the attacks described in previous
sections. The metrics that we consider are the following: 1) Total CPU time, 2) Total
Low Power Mode (LPM) time, 3) Total TX time, and 4) Total RX time. The total
time was averaged over all honest nodes. Results are shown in Figure 6. The blue line
in the graphs represents the resource usage when there is no attack (labelled “Honest
Network” in subfigures).
8.1. Packet flooding
As shown in Figure 6a, total CPU usage was increased by 265% during the attack
while nodes were in LPM for 3% less of the time (Fig. 6b). This is expected as nodes
are either in CPU or LPM, the time lost in LPM was gained in CPU mode. The time
spent in TX mode by nodes is shown in Figure 6c. In the attack scenario, TX mode is
increased by 940%. Similarly, the time that nodes were in RX mode (Fig. 6d) increased
by 329%. As a result, packet flooding affects mostly the time that nodes are in TX
mode.
8.2. Hello flooding
We observe that the attack increased the CPU usage by 226% (Fig. 6a) and that the
nodes are in LPM mode for 2% less of the time during the attack (Fig. 6b). Again, as
the node is either in CPU or LPM mode, the time lost in LPM was gained in CPU
mode. Total TX time is increased by 780% when attack happens as depicted in Figure
6c. Also as Figure 6d shows, the time the node was in RX mode is increased by 81%
12
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Figure 6. Total resource usage over simulation time for various attacks
during the attack. Similarly to packet flooding, Hello flooding affects mostly the time
in TX mode.
8.3. Selective forwarding
In the selective forwarding attack, all nodes send packets to the server through node
3 because it is in their range except node 7 which can directly reach the server. In
this way, malicious node 3 can drop packets and forward only selected ones. Results
in Figure 6 show that usage figures of all the four considered resources are almost
identical to those of the no-attack scenario. Hence, this attack has no considerable
effect on the power usage of nodes but affects only the number of received packets of
the server.
The expected number of packets to be dropped during the simulation are illustrated
in Figure 7. Specifically, the graph shows the expected packet dropped ratio depending
on the number of nodes sending to the malicious node and the drop ratio of the
malicious node. In our experiment, 4 nodes are sending packets to the malicious node
and all data packets are dropped. If we look at the blackhole points (blue) on the
graph, when the nodes are 4 it shows that 80% of all packets in the network should
have been dropped. That is correct in our case as the server receives packets from node
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Figure 7. Selective forwarding: Percentage of packets dropped
7 only. The other colours represent different cases of greyhole attacks and the number
of packets that should be dropped. Overall, the results of this set of simulations are
as expected, i.e. the number of dropped packets grow linearly with the drop rate and
with the number of nodes sending to the malicious node. We nevertheless include the
results for completeness.
8.4. Versioning attack
Figure 6a shows the CPU usage is increased by 1146% during the attack. Moreover,
Figure 6b depicts that nodes are in LPM for 12% less of the time. Thus, during
the attack the time lost in LPM was gained in CPU mode. Figure 6c represents the
time that TX mode is activated in nodes. This has risen to 5720% while RX mode is
increased by 478% as shown in Figure 6d. That means that versioning attack has a
significant effect on the network as a whole and a large impact on each of the nodes.
8.5. Rank attack
The results illustrate that the resources used for TX and RX are almost identical to
those of the no-attack scenario. This is also the case for CPU and LPM modes. That
means the attack alone has no effect on the power usage. It is mainly used to increase
the impact of other attacks. For example, a blackhole attack could be combined with a
rank attack to make it more harmful. Apart from that, this attack allows the malicious
node to eavesdrop on all packets being sent to it. Although it does not affect the power
usage, it can cause serious damage to an IoT network.
8.6. Stretch attack
Although the worst attack seems to be versioning attack, we were still interested in
implementing the stretch attack in Cooja simulator. This type of attack is an extended
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version of Hello flooding in which rather than sending packets from source to sink, it
uses a longer route to cause a higher rate of energy usage throughout the network.
Thus, smart sensors should be exhausted earlier than during a Hello flooding attack.
In order to compare power consumption, we used three different battery types; 2xAAA
(1000 mAh), CR2032 (225 mAh), and CR123A (1500 mAh). This was achieved with
the help of Kinetic Battery module of ContikiOS. The network used in this scenario
consisted of 9 honest nodes, one malicious node and one server.
Table 4. Average network battery consumption for different
battery–attack combinations
Scenario
No Attack Stretch Attack
B
a
tt
e
r
y 2xAAA (1000 mAh) 11.32% 27.22%
CR2032 (225 mAh) 50.40% Empty
CR123A (1500 mAh) 7.55% 18.20%
Table 4 depicts the average battery consumption over the entire network of honest
nodes when they are idle and when they are under stretch attack. The duration of
the experiment was one hour. If the results for each individual node are taken into ac-
count, some have a much higher battery usage than others. Generally, average battery
consumption is high when stretch attack occurs. However, the only time the average
battery consumption was enough to deplete is when the battery had 225 mAh during
the stretch attack. Using the smallest battery (225 mAh), some nodes started to run
out after only 30 minutes, and after 50 minutes six of the nine nodes had completely
run out of battery. After an hour, nodes with 1000 mAh battery had been left at only
57% battery life. Although the stretch attack did not deplete any of the nodes using
the 2xAAA battery or the CR123A battery, a rogue node emitting too many Hello
packets could achieve that.
8.7. Power consumption
A comparison between power consumption for each implemented attack is presented in
Table 5. As is it depicted, both rank attack and selective forwarding have no effect on
the overall power consumption. However, the rank attack can be used to make other
attacks more severe while the selective forwarding degrades the service of the system
by impairing the packet throughput. The ‘Hello’ flooding attack despite multicasting
messages, it achieves the lowest increase in power consumption. This is because the
malicious node has not been configured to send a large amount of packets to other
nodes. Also, the packets sent are small in size because they contain no data and their
header is small. Looking at packet flooding attack, it uses twice as much energy as
the ‘Hello’ flooding. The packets sent by this are large as they contain all the routing
and protocol information as well as data. So, this increases the energy expenditure
per packet sent. The most severe attack according to the table is versioning attack. It
consumes more than double the power consumption of a packet flooding. This attack
can cause serious damage because it affects all network nodes as the malicious node
constantly sends messages to all of its neighbours trying to reconstruct the network.
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Table 5. Power consumption with and without attacks
Attack Power consumption (mW) Increase (mW) Increase (%)
No attack 9.202 Zero Zero
Packet flooding 44.726 35.524 386%
Selective forwarding 9.729 Negligible Negligible
Versioning 105.834 96.632 1050%
Rank 9.125 Negligible Negligible
Hello flooding 24.945 15.743 171%
9. Comparison between various attacks
In this section we compare all the attacks we considered with respect to the vari-
ous resource consummation criteria. The results are compiled in Table 6 to facilitate
comparison. As the table shows, Versioning Attacks are quite powerful in wasting the
resources of the network, achieving around 4 times the increase in CPU time and
TX time, more than around 4 times the decrease in LPM time, and around 3 times
the increase in battery consumption compared to those of Packet Flooding and Hello
Flooding attacks, respectively. At the same time, Versioning Attacks inflict the most
RX time increase, with Packet Flooding and Hello Flooding following suite. Packet
Flooding and Hello Flooding perform similarly with respect to CPU time, LPM time,
and TX time. However, Packet Flooding is able to waste almost four times the amount
of RX time and double the battery power compared to Hello Flooding. Selective For-
warding and Rank Attacks do not waste much of CPU time, RX/TX time, or battery
but they affect the network in other ways as discussed before.
Table 6. Comparison of various attacks with respect to usage of various resources
Attack CPU Time LPM TX Time RX Time Battery Consumption
Type Increase Decrease Increase Increase Increase
Packet Flooding 265% 3% 1279% 329% 386%
Hello Flooding 226% 2% 1275% 81% 171%
Selective Forwarding negligible negligible negligible negligible negligible
Versioning Attack 1146% 12% 4750% 478% 1050%
Rank Attack negligible negligible negligible negligible negligible
10. Conclusion
In this paper, several aspects of smart devices and how different network setups affect
their battery life is studied. Literature showed that network edge devices are insecure
and specifically their hardware components, such as batteries and connectivity capa-
bilities, could be easily exploited. Following this, we explored five main attacks that
can be launched to exhaust devices’ small batteries. Our results show that certain
attacks are able to dramatically increase energy consumption and affect device’s op-
erations. Furthermore, a scenario implementing the stretch attack was done in order
to study the effects of this extreme case. Simulations showed that when sending even
small numbers of packets, typical IoT devices’ batteries can easily be drained in 60
minutes. Moreover, devices closer to rogue nodes are more affected by the attacks than
16
others.
In our future work we care planning to compare the derived simulation results to the
results obtained via actual IoT hardware implementations. Finally, we will investigate
the impact on the battery life when combining two or more attack types.
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